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Abstract: This article is concerned with the links that exist between control of inter-
organisational relationships and effects of proximity. We propose a theoretical framework 
which explains how geographical and organisational proximities reinforce formal and 
informal control mechanisms. This framework is then used to analyse mechanisms of control 
by proximity in a French aerospace cluster. We observe that formal and informal control is 
concentrated in a small number of groups located near the majority of the establishments 
members of the cluster. We also show that informal control mechanisms require a stronger 
geographical proximity than formal control mechanisms in order to operate. 
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JEL classification: L14; L62; R38; R58. 
 
2 
 
 
Introduction 
Approaches dealing with the control of relationships between organisations and with the role 
of proximity in the dynamics of interactions between organisations still appear to remain 
separate from one other. They have, nevertheless, numerous points in common. Work on 
control of relationships throws light on the necessity of controlling the risks inherent in any 
relationship in order to ensure its durability. The proximity approach on the other hand tries to 
determine the conditions which exist at the inception or the reinforcement of a relationship. 
The sharing of standards, beliefs and values is a control mechanism (e.g. OUCHI, 1979; DAS 
TENG, 2001), whereas proximity-orientated authors insist on the sharing of a common 
cognitive framework as a pre-requisite for any coordination (e.g. TORRE and RALLET, 
2005; BOSCHMA, 2005; CARRINCAZEAUX et al., 2008a; RYCHEN and 
ZIMMERMANN, 2008). On the one hand, trust is perceived as an instrument of control 
(DEKKER, 2004), on the other, as an essential ingredient of proximity (DUPUY and 
TORRE, 2004). The particular objective of control is to orientate interactions, which are 
themselves largely fashioned by their social and geographical integration as shown by the 
proximity-orientated analysis. 
These common points suggest that a convergence of the two strands of research could be 
fruitful. For example, the question of the possible influence of geographical proximity on 
inter-organisational control mechanisms has yet to be posed: in other words, does 
geographical proximity favour control over a partner? More generally, this line of questioning 
can be extended to the non-spatial dimension of proximity, to investigate the role of 
proximity, in all its dimensions, in control mechanisms. The principal objective of this work 
is to respond to this question and to construct, in an original way, a theoretical framework 
allowing an understanding of control mechanisms in terms of proximity.  
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This question of the link between control and proximity is particularly pertinent in the case of 
cooperation between organisations operating in the same locality where the aim is innovation. 
The theoretical framework will thus be used to analyse the case of collaborative Research and 
Development (R&D) projects undertaken within clusters set up in France and known as 
competitiveness clusters1. Centres for the creation and exchange of knowledge, the 
relationships within clusters are often studied from the point of view of sharing and of the 
necessary recombination of complementary knowledge, linking innovation and proximity 
with the objective of learning by the partners from one another. Now, this link between 
innovation and proximity must also be examined in terms of the control exercised by one 
partner on another: in effect, the control of a relationship which necessitates the exchange of 
existing knowledge in order to produce new, common knowledge is a condition sine qua non 
of its durability. Particularly sensitive to opportunist behaviour, the process of joint 
innovation and the sharing of the results of such innovation must be controlled, the different 
types of proximity playing a role in this control and in the probability of the success of the 
innovation. 
We propose to study the Aerospace Valley cluster, located in the southwest of France, 
specialising in aerospace activities. Like all competitiveness clusters, its objective is to favour 
collective innovation between co-localised partners by profiting from the positive effects of 
proximity. To do this, it gives financial support to collaborative R&D projects between close 
partners. Now, these projects are characterised by the significant domination, and thus 
control, by big industrial groups. More precisely, we evaluate the different forms of control 
and of proximity within different Strategic Business Units (SBUs) of this cluster using in 
particular the methodology of analysis of social networks.  
This study is presented in three parts. In the first part, we present our theoretical framework, 
describing mechanisms of control by proximity. In the second part, we present our empirical 
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and methodological choices. Finally, we present and discuss our principal results in the third 
part.  
 
1 Theoretical framework: control by proximity 
We present successively the principal mechanisms of the two categories of control which are 
traditionally distinguished, next we characterise the dimensions of proximity and finally we 
suggest how these approaches articulate with one another by defining control by proximity.  
 
1.1 Controls: definitions and mechanisms 
There are at least two major categories of reasons to explain the failure of a relationship 
between two organisations: opportunist behaviour by the partners and/or a lack of 
coordination (DEKKER, 2004). Control of the relationship thus aims to prevent such failure 
and, more generally, to reduce the risks and the costs inherent in any relationship based on an 
exchange. From a behavioural point of view, control becomes a particular type of relationship 
through which an individual or an organisation influences the action of another individual or 
organisation to the benefit of the former (NOGATCHEWSKY, 2003). By dissuading 
opportunist behaviour and by maintaining the convergence between actions, control helps 
organisations to achieve their objectives (KIRSCH, 1996).  
The question of the control of an inter-organisational relationship, the case which concerns us 
here, is approached in the literature from different angles: shared control (AREND, 
2006),strategic alliances (DAS and TENG, 2001; DEKKER, 2004), networks (KAJUTER and 
KULMALA, 2005), joint-ventures (CHALOS and O’CONNOR, 2004; KAMMINGA and 
VAN DER MEER-KOOISTRA, 2007), control of the supply chain (DONADA and 
NOGACHEWSKY, 2006; MUDAMBI, 2008), etc2. The majority of these studies distinguish 
two complementary types of control: formal and informal. Formal control is based on 
5 
 
 
contractual engagements between partners and on objectifiable, explicit mechanisms. The 
sanctions applicable in the case of inappropriate behaviour are essentially legal. It aims: 
- firstly, to control results with the help of various highly codified mechanisms. These 
control mechanisms may be ex ante or ex post in relation to the objective of the 
control (DEKKER, 2004). Ex ante, includes, for example, the establishment of 
objectives which clarify the expectations of the partners. Ex post, the disparity 
between actual and expected performance is measured using evaluation systems 
drawn, for example, from management control (CAKER, 2008); 
- secondly, to orientate behaviour via standardised ex ante procedures specifying 
expected behaviour, schedules, rules. The conformity of these behaviours in relation to 
these same procedure and rules (OUCHI, 1979) is then evaluated ex post.  
Formal control supposes that the results are easily measurable and the behaviours relatively 
programmable. If this is not the case, one can associate with it informal control founded 
essentially on tacit mechanisms, that is to say self-regulation dependent on the psychological 
and social characteristics of those who draw them up (GROSSETI and BES, 2001). In the 
case of inappropriate behaviour, the sanctions tend to be moral. Trust3 proves to be a 
particularly efficient informal control instrument in inter-organisational relationships 
(DEKKER, 2004). Ex ante, this informal control mechanism allows the user to select a 
partner in terms of its supposed capacity to satisfy common interests and of the skills which it 
can deploy, in other words, its reputation. Ex post, it emerges over time with repeated and 
successful interactions (achievement of objectives, resolution of problems, loyalty, etc.) but 
also because each partner becomes more familiar with the skills and expectations of the other.  
Formal and informal control are related by links of a complementary nature. Whereas formal 
control reduces the motivation to adopt opportunist, or simply less effective, behaviour, trust 
reduces, in a complementary fashion, the fear that such behaviour will arise in the first place 
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(DAS and TENG, 2001). BORNAREL (2008) notes that trust curbs opportunist behaviour 
without resorting to formal mechanisms because loss of such trust carries a high cost. 
Resorting to trust would appear to be more justified in very uncertain situations with strong 
interdependence: when formal control of behaviour and results are limited, trust becomes an 
informal, implicit means of ensuring control. Furthermore, excessive use of formal control 
can destroy any trust that may have built up during interactions, thus giving the impression 
that one partner distrusts the other (DAS and TENG, 1998).  
Above and beyond trust, the convergence of interests and the sharing of standards, beliefs and 
values within a social group are also strong informal control mechanisms, phenomena called 
“clan control” by OUCHI (1979). The author is referring here to the social pressure which is 
exerted on each member of an organisation and which orientates his behaviour in favour of 
the interests of the group and in accordance with its common values. Respect for the rules is 
rewarded by the fact of belonging to a community whose members have been selected 
(KIRSCH, 1996). 
Once set up, control mechanisms allow the process of social interactions to get under way, 
which in turn nourishes the trust between the partners thus becoming self-reinforcing. The 
control mechanisms are no longer regarded as a curb on interactions; on the contrary they 
play a strategic role in their perpetuation, securing exchanges of information and of 
knowledge and the learning processes necessary, for example, for collective innovation. Next 
we question whether these two forms of control are exercised by the same actors and whether 
proximity has an impact on the exercise of these two forms of control. 
 
1.2 Proximity: definitions and mechanisms 
The proximity approach starts from the principle that geographical location and the position 
in a network of interactions condition the economic activities of organisations, in the sense 
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that the characteristics of social and geographical integration have for vocation “the 
conditioning of the probability of the emergence of a relationship or of the reinforcement or 
weakening of an existing relationship” (PECQUEUR and ZIMMERMANN, 2004, p. 20). 
The approach aims to determine what conditions are necessary for the emergence and/or the 
reinforcement of a relationship.  
According to this approach, a participant in a network is present both “here and elsewhere”. 
Here because it is located in a geographical space within which it has “neighbourly” 
relationships, elsewhere because the participant obviously has long-distance relationships 
with other participants. It is true that one can be “close” to someone while being 
geographically remote from them: proximity then presents, besides the geographical 
dimension, a non-geographical dimension allowing one to pose at the same time the question 
of location and of organisation. Even if the number of dimensions distinguished may vary 
according to the author, all agree that there is a seminal distinction between geographical and 
non-geographical dimensions of proximity (CARRINCAZEAUX et al., 2008b). This is the 
case in France where the debate concerning the different forms of proximity has crystallised 
around the question of whether it is necessary to conserve a distinction between institutional 
proximity and organisational proximity, alongside geographical proximity. In our case, 
proximity will be understood as an institutional fact presenting two dimensions, geographical 
and organisational (TALBOT, 2010). In the same way, whatever the theoretical position 
adopted concerning the different forms of proximity, all the authors of the “proximity school” 
agree that in the majority of cases proximity favours the emergence and the development of 
innovation: “The more proximity between actors (in whatever form), the more they interact, 
the more they learn to innovate” (BOSCHMA, 2005, p. 15). 
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1.2.1 Geographical proximity 
Geographical proximity tackles the question of the conditions of localisation of activities 
(PECQUEUR  and ZIMMERMANN, 2004). It is not the inverse of the metric distance. 
Distance, which leads one to think of separation, is a quantitative expression of the 
relationship between two objects and/or two individuals. Proximity is a qualitative judgement, 
necessarily subjective and difficult to measure, of a small geographical distance. Qualitative, 
it becomes a unit of social measurement with two fundamental values: “to be close to”, “to be 
far from”, constituting the extremities of a single continuum (TORRE and RALLET, 2005). 
Through its effects geographical proximity favours the emergence and/or the reinforcement of 
a relationship in at least two ways. In the first place, geographical proximity facilitates face-
to-face interactions, which themselves facilitate the exchange of knowledge, particularly of 
tacit knowledge (POLANYI, 1983; GERTLER, 2003). We come back to the classical idea 
according to which physical space is structured by transport and telecommunication 
infrastructures. It then constitutes a physical framework favouring the circulation of 
information, of physical goods and of individuals and facilitating face-to-face interactions. In 
the case of permanent geographical proximity, it is possible to organise face-to-face 
interaction at very short notice. Sometimes the need for geographical proximity can vary over 
the period of the interactions. This need may be intense in order to start the relationship 
and/or during the first phases of learning between actors who are innovating together: in this 
case it may be satisfied by the mobility of the actors in order to enable the face to face 
interactions which at certain moments remain essential. This need for temporary geographical 
proximity may be satisfied in various places: the company of course (meetings, technical 
platform teams) but also in temporary clusters (salons, conferences). TORRE (2008) thus 
insists on the importance of not confusing a need for geographical proximity with permanent 
co-location. 
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Secondly space constitutes a cognitive reference. All the participants live within groups 
situated in the same geographical space and associate values, perceptions, customs, lifestyles, 
a history, a name, physical and administrative boundaries, a memory of previous co-ordinated 
actions (successful or otherwise), conflicts, etc., with a geographical area. Thus the place 
participates in the process of construction – or of destruction – of identities inasmuch as it is a 
component of the relationship to others since the local participants make it exist in the eyes of 
others. It is then at the origin of a sense of belonging: claiming to come from a particular 
place equates, by association, to claiming to come from a particular social group (GIDDENS, 
1984). Space becomes a more or less important ingredient of collective action, inasmuch as it 
permits or inhibits coordination. 
However, the fact of feeling geographically “close” should not be interpreted as an assurance 
that a relationship is necessarily established between the participants, even if it opens the way. 
It simply means that the existence of a strong geographical proximity between participants is 
not neutral: it makes the possibility of a relationship more likely, it is a resource that is still 
latent.  
Geographical proximity only plays a role in terms of its articulation with a proximity of an 
organisational nature, which it supports, reinforces, compensates, or destroys by proving to be 
a source of conflicts.  
 
1.2.2 Organisational proximity 
Organisational proximity is deployed between individuals or between. It is built over a short 
social distance, in the same way as geographical proximity is built over a short physical 
distance. Social distance refers to the attributes of the participants in terms of cognitive and 
material resources, their age, their sex, etc., in fact the whole set of objective criteria which 
allow us to classify individuals into more or less homogeneous groups. Social distance also 
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concerns organisations, for example companies in the same sector of activity which share the 
same markets, the same technologies, the same products, etc. This small social distance can 
take a more organisational form when two establishments adopt a similar structure: two 
research laboratories, two small firms or two subsidiaries of industrial groups have more or 
less identical constraints, objectives, interests, legal statuses which facilitate a priori the 
future mutual understanding necessary to the emergence of a relationship.  
A small social distance is not sufficient to create an organisational proximity: thus two 
companies within the same industry may have no relationship apart from the simple, direct 
one of being competitors. In this sense, proximity is not simply the inverse of distance and 
cannot be reduced to simple similarity of characteristics. One is close to someone else when 
one not only resembles the other but when one shares various resources with him. One can 
speak of organisational proximity between organisations when they share, above and beyond 
a similarity in their legal structure, a language, perceptions, knowledge, know-how and a 
collective project signifying common strategic thinking as for example between two 
establishments of the same industrial group. When they are shared, these cognitive resources 
allow the acquisition, conservation and transmission of knowledge, know-how, experience, in 
other words to activate an inter-organisational relationship: in this way we move from a 
resemblance to a positive connection.  
But the sharing of cognitive resources is not the only condition for the establishment of an 
inter-organisational relationship. When these resources take the form of moral values, social 
standards, rules or routines as between two public laboratories or two SMEs, they also act as 
regulatory tools for the relationship. In effect, it is necessary in addition to give coherence to 
contradictory interests, regulate conflicts which remain latent, prioritise problems, arbitrate, 
for example, the share of profits to which the parties aspire as a result of the interaction, or 
work out compromises. In other words, for a relationship to develop, it is necessary, alongside 
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cognitive resources, to share coordinated regulatory tools. Sharing of regulatory tools, desired 
or imposed, is the second condition for the establishment of an interaction. In reality, these 
tools, like rules, are most often indistinguishable from cognitive resources inasmuch as they 
fulfil both roles simultaneously.  
 
1.3 Control by the two types of proximity 
The link between control and proximity, particularly in terms of the analysis of the process of 
the emergence of innovations, has not yet been directly studied in the literature. The question 
posed in this part is the following: in terms of relationships, what is necessary to exercise 
control? Our response: proximity. We distinguish control by geographical proximity from 
control by organisational proximity.  
 
1.3.1 Control by geographical proximity  
Participants can use two of the effects of geographical proximity to exercise their control. 
Firstly, face-to-face interaction is the occasion to improve the efficiency of formal control of 
productive relations because it allows, on the one hand, discussions to be interactive and, on 
the other, a reduction in the uncertainty leading from the tacit dimension inherent in all 
knowledge and in the risks of opportunism (BOSCHMA, 2005). In the same way, informal 
control, being based on mechanisms of shared standards, values, beliefs and trust, develops 
thanks to frequent meetings (LANGFIELD-SMITH and SMITH, 2003) made all the easier 
when the different parties are geographically close. 
Secondly, geographical proximity indirectly favours informal control. It is known that social 
networks are often based in one locality. As GROSSETI and BES (2001) make clear, the 
creation and maintenance of social relationships pre-supposes frequent face-to-face 
interactions of a relatively routine nature which cannot be too dispersed. This explains why a 
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significant proportion of social networks are spatially concentrated. Now, certain economic 
relationships are embedded (GRANOVETTER, 1985) in these localised social networks, in 
the sense that the economic activity is dependent on the personal relationships between those 
who carry it out. Informal control benefits from this embedding: it is more difficult to adopt 
an opportunist strategy to the detriment of a neighbour with whom one shares the same social 
network. In a way, geographical proximity seals the relationship between agents who would 
have to pay in terms of their personal relationship any opportunist behaviour adopted in the 
economic sphere.  
 
1.3.2 Control by organisational proximity  
OUCHI (1979) lists a certain number of pre-requisites to the exercise of control: these include 
rules, values and beliefs defining adequate behaviour, a legitimate hierarchical structure into 
which everyone must fit: these constitute cognitive resources and regulatory tools which must 
be shared. In other words, in the same way that organisational proximity conditions the 
emergence and/or the reinforcement of a relationship in general, it conditions the 
effectiveness of inter-organisational control in particular.  
More precisely, organisational proximity allows the setting up of formal control mechanisms. 
We have seen that the latter operate thanks to mechanisms which regulate behaviour (fixing 
of objectives, procedures, systems for monitoring and evaluating results and behaviour) thus 
making the relationship possible by securing it, each party being able to assure itself that the 
actions of its partners conform to its objectives and interests (NOGATCHEWSKY, 2003). 
Now, these mechanisms cannot exist unless the controllers and the controlled already have a 
minimum quantity of perceptions, knowledge and rules in common. In the same way, 
informal control is based on auto-regulatory mechanisms which require shared standards, 
values and beliefs (OUCHI, 1979), sharing which, for proximity authors, equates to the very 
13 
 
 
definition of organisational proximity. Moreover, organisational proximity creates trust 
towards others (DUPUY and TORRE, 2004) because of the similarities shown by close 
partners and because of the spirit of loyalty which can be generated by the fact of belonging 
to one and the same organisation: resemblance and belonging are sources of trust.  
In the end, organisational proximity conditions control. It may possibly be reinforced by a 
geographical proximity between controllers and controlled. In return, as in any relationship, 
control will nourish proximities, via the mechanisms which are put into place, in a cumulative 
process. Thus the causal distinction made here between proximity and control is above all 
analytical, given the fact that it is so difficult in reality to separate out the causal links 
between the two concepts. To conclude this first section, the table below synthesises our 
vision of the concepts of proximity and of control, as well as the different mechanisms of 
control by proximity.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1: Forms of control and proximity 
 
 
In the following section, we test the way in which the parties to collaborative projects under 
the aegis of the Aerospace Valley cluster control their relationships using proximity. More 
precisely, we first examine whether informal and formal controls are practised by the same 
actors or if they are dispersed inside the cluster. Secondly, we look for the role of the two 
types of proximity in facilitating the two forms of control: can we observe any correlations 
between a form of proximity and a form of control? 
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2 Data and methodology: evaluation of the forms of control and proximity within the 
Aerospace Valley competitiveness cluster 
2.1 The data: collaborative R&D projects in the Strategic Business Units of the 
Aerospace Valley cluster 
As in other countries, French government policy concerning business and research clusters 
(competitiveness clusters) finds its roots in the notion of clusters (PORTER, 1998), which 
showed that permanent geographical proximity between participants, when it is desired, is a 
factor which favours the creation and the diffusion of knowledge. Indeed, in this way 
government policy aims to accentuate, through cluster-labelled mechanisms, the 
agglomeration of participants likely to innovate jointly, in the hope that geographical 
proximity, as a facilitator of face-to-face interactions, will play a beneficial role in terms of 
supporting organisational proximity. Since the launching of the policy in 2005, 71 clusters 
have been labelled as competitiveness clusters, including 14 world clusters. But, this policy 
has another aspect: it supports, through labelling mechanisms but also through public 
financial aid, collaborative R&D projects bringing together major firms, small and medium-
sized businesses and research laboratories. The policy seeks to create progressively, as 
different interactions take place, a memory of successful cognitive coordination and policies 
and thus to build up trust between private and public organisations.  
The AESE (Aeronautics, Space & On-board Systems) cluster, more often referred to as the 
“Aerospace Valley Cluster” is one of the world clusters created in 2005 in the Aquitaine and 
Midi-Pyrénées regions (in southwest France).In 2007, the cluster brought together 340 
establishments and employed 64 421 people4. Unlike the majority of the clusters in France, 
this cluster is dominated by establishments controlled by industrial groups (203 
establishments out of 340) and principally French groups (170 establishments), even if it does 
also include small and medium-sized firms and specialised research and training centres. 
15 
 
 
Despite being specialised in the aeronautical and space industries (48% of jobs), the 
Aerospace Valley cluster includes a wide spectrum of activities. The collaborative R&D 
projects undertaken in this cluster are in fact grouped into 9 Strategic Business Units (SBUs) 
representing the principal technological domains studied, from aeronautical activities to the 
design and production of satellites, and including embedded systems (cf. table 2 for details of 
the SBUs).  
For several reasons, the aeronautical industry represents a field of observation which is 
relevant to our line of questioning. This cluster specialises in the aerospace industry has been 
chosen because of the strength of the control exercised by principals over contractors 
(KECHIDI and TALBOT, 2010; WINK, 2010), the former seeking to control the latter, 
whereas the latter aim to free themselves from the former. The strategies of externalisation 
developed by the aircraft manufacturers have led to the emergence of equipment 
manufacturers possessing specific skills: they are theoretically able to adopt opportunist 
behavior which calls for control. In addition to this strong asymmetry between the participants 
comes the question of joint innovation in a high technology industry: high R&D costs and the 
widening of the spectrum of skills necessary for the design of aircraft products encourage 
collaboration based on proximity (GILLY et al., 2011). Thus, whether it relates to the transfer 
of knowledge or to the sharing of results of joint innovation, the question of control by 
proximity becomes meaningful. 
 
2.2 Methodology for the evaluation of proximity within SBUs  
The methodology must allow us both to reveal the existing instances of proximity between the 
partners in collaborative projects within the SBU and to evaluate the control relationships 
which exist between them. In order to achieve this, the weight of organisational and 
geographical proximity is evaluated using simple statistical tools, whereas we use social 
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network analysis to reveal formal and informal control relationships. We can thus compare 
the 9 SBUs in terms of the weighting of the different forms of proximity and control 
exercised.  
Following the methodology used for example by VICENTE et al., 2010, in the sector of 
GNSS industry, we consider each SBU as a set of dyadic relationships between two 
establishments working together within the framework of a collaborative research project (cf. 
table 2). Indeed, even if all the participants in a single project have not the same degree of 
interaction, we could suppose that all the actors of a same project collaborate together even 
punctually. We propose to evaluate, using a binary variable equal to 0 or 1, the existence of 
different forms of proximity between two participants, then to calculate the mean and 
standard deviation of the number of dyadic relationships between two close participants 
within each of these SBUs5.  
In order to evaluate organisational proximity, we have used three indicators which signify the 
sharing of cognitive resources and regulatory tools (cf. table A in the annex):  
- organisational proximity varies in intensity depending on whether the two partners are 
members of the same organization (as industrial group) or not. We distinguish the case 
where dyadic relationships develop between two establishments from the same 
organisation and that in which such relationships develop between different 
organisations;  
- two establishments share different statutes, legal and hierarchical rules, knowledge, 
know-how, values, collective projects depending on whether they are members of an 
industrial group or of a research laboratory. Here it is the organisational forms, 
revealing varying degrees of organisational proximity, which are different. Five 
organisational forms are distinguished: small and medium-sized firms (fewer than 200 
employees), companies with 200 to 1000 employees, industrial groups of more than 
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1000 employees, public research laboratories and non-profit organisations. This 
indicator focuses in the first place on two similarities in character, legal structure and 
size: what is evaluated is thus the small social distance more than the organisational 
proximity in its entirety, even if the former is an essential component of the latter; 
- operating in the same sector of activity pre-supposes sharing of cognitive resources 
such as technical knowledge, know-how and perceptions6. We thus propose in a third 
stage to differentiate the establishments of the cluster according to their sector of 
activity. In order to do this we have used the classification into 21 categories7 derived 
from the nomenclature of the activities of French companies drawn up by INSEE: the 
French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies. First of all, the 
establishments of the cluster belong for the most part to 3 fields of activity. 88 
companies specialise in industrial activities (“Manufacturing Industries” sector): this 
category brings together in particular the principal aeronautical architect-integrator 
and major suppliers. Next, 220 establishments belong to the “Specialised Scientific 
and Technical Activities” sector: these are public research laboratories, but also 
companies carrying out research and development activities and engineering activities. 
Finally 39 establishments belong to the “Information and Communication” sector: 
these are companies which carry out programming and information technology 
consulting.  
Geographical proximity, as we have seen in the first part, is a judgment made about a small 
distance. If it is difficult to measure a judgment, the next best approach consists of integrating 
into the analysis the small geographical distance which separates the participants, considering 
that this is a necessary condition for the construction of a geographical proximity. A short 
geographical distance is considered here as signalling a possible geographical proximity: if 
face-to-face interactions are really facilitated in the case of a short geographical distance, 
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nothing indicates on the other hand that a strong sentiment of belonging to a group also exists 
from the fact of being associated with a place. This method allows us to take into account 
only one of the mechanisms of facilitation of relationships that is exercised by geographical 
proximity. In order to do this, we thus consider that two participants are all closer 
geographically when they are situated in the same urban area8. 
 
2.3 A measure of control by the analysis of interaction networks 
SBUs and collaborative projects are not exempt from control, on the contrary, it is necessary 
to control the way in which this knowledge is disseminated. Control also concerns the sharing 
of the results of the collaboration and in a general manner the way in which the interactions 
take place.  
Network analysis offers a method of measuring control in the form of individual scores of 
centrality resulting from the position of the participant in the system of relationships 
(LAZEGA, 1994). These different measurements of the centrality of participants were in fact 
developed with the intention of measuring the relationships of power – and thus of control – 
within groups of individuals (DEGENNE and FORSE, 2004). This methodology is used, for 
example, in financial literature to measure the control exercised by board members through 
their places in the networks of boards of the major international groups (PICHARD-
STAMFORD, 2000; BORGATTI and FOSTER, 2003; GUIEU and MESCHI, 2008). It is also 
used to measure potential organisational power viewed as a structural position (BRASS and 
BURKARDT, 1993). 
In order to determine whether participants are in a position to exercise a form of control, we 
propose to construct networks of interactions and thus characterise their positions within each 
SBU. As is shown in figure 1 in the annex, we have constructed undirected networks: each 
establishment represents a node of the network and each link represents the common 
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participation in a collaborative project between two participants. Then, in order to measure the 
position of control of the different participants within this network, we use indicators of the 
position of the participants (in our case establishments) within the networks represented and 
more precisely the indicators of centrality. Two forms of centrality can be identified:  
- degree centrality measures the number of links maintained by a participant in a 
network divided by the number of possible links9. A high indicator of degree centrality 
thus represents an above-average level of collaboration with all the other participants 
in the network. We have previously highlighted the fact that informal control takes 
place in particular by means of a mechanism of development of trust. We suppose that 
a participant who collaborates more strongly with all the other participants of the 
network will inspire more trust because, as we have already said, such trust emerges as 
a result of repeated, successful interactions. Moreover, the subject’s multiple 
relationships allow him to disseminate the beliefs and values of the network and thus 
to exercise a social pressure allowing him to orientate behaviour in favour of the 
collective interest. He is thus in a better position than others to exercise an informal 
control. Degree centrality will thus be used as an indicator of the degree of informal 
control of a participant in the network; 
- betweenness centrality is an index which allows one to measure the fact that a 
participant in the network is an intermediary between two other participants of the 
network10. Thus it is also a measure of informal control exercised by the participants 
of the network and more precisely of the control exercised by a participant on the 
relationships between the other participants. As before, a participant positioned 
between the other participants of the network will have been able to progressively 
establish trust, whereas this role of intermediary allows him to disseminate the beliefs 
and the values of the social group that makes up the network. Thus we use 
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betweenness centrality as a complementary indicator of the informal control exercised 
by a participant.  
In order to compare the degree of control within each of the 9 SBUs, we have presented, in 
table 2, information on the mean of these different indicators of centrality within each SBU, 
as well as the maximum degree of centrality. Thus, just like other contributors to this special 
issue (BALLAND et al., 2013; BOUBA-OLGA and FERU, 2013), we have chosen to use the 
methodology of social networks to study the role of proximity in the interactions between 
actors in the innovation process. Nevertheless our approach stands apart from the rest of these 
contributions in the sense that we use this methodology as a measure of the control that one 
actor can exercise upon another11. 
Within an SBU control can equally be exercised in a more formal manner through the 
management of the SBU. This management activity consists essentially of defining the 
objectives of collaborative projects and of verifying that they are consistent with the common 
strategy that prevails within the SBU. The definition of these objectives takes place during 
regular meetings. The institution of common rules in order to decide which sources of finance 
to apply for when seeking funds for a research project contributes to the development of a 
collective strategy. This management activity thus allows partial characterisation of formal 
control, previously defined as a form of control whose aim is to control results and behaviour 
by the definition of objectives, the setting up of standardized procedures, of schedules and of 
rules. 
To summarise, we propose to compare, on the one hand, informal control evaluated through 
the central position in the active network (whatever means are used to calculate centrality) 
and, on the other hand, formal control via the management of the SBU. The result of this 
comparison is given in the following table and will be discussed in the following section. 
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INSERT TABLE 2: measurement of control and proximity within the SBUs of the Aerospace 
Valley cluster 
 
3 Results and discussion 
Tables 1 and figure 1 in the annex allow us to see different forms of dispersion of formal and 
informal control depending on the SBU. This leads us to propose a typology of the SBUs in 
four categories according to the form of control exercised. We will then study the weighting 
of the different forms of proximity within these four groups of SBUs.  
 
3.1 Intensity and dispersion of the forms of control within the SBUs 
The first group is composed uniquely of the SE SBU. It is characterised by the fact that the 
formal and informal controls are exercised by the same dominant participants: two big 
industrial groups and a research laboratory of the University of Toulouse 3 which are at the 
same time managers of the SBU and present very high degrees of centrality within the 
network of participants of this same SBU. Here, the control is tight and concentrated on a few 
participants. Here we find an expression of control exercised by the aeronautical industry’s 
prime manufacturers. 
For the NPT, AMS and ATSS SBUs (group 2), a major aeronautical company undertakes 
both formal control (managing the SBU) and informal control (high degree of centrality). But 
the management of the SBU is equally undertaken by medium-sized companies or public 
research organisations which, at the same time, are only rarely included in the collaborative 
projects of the SBU: they thus exercise a control which is above all formal. 
For the EPEE, ASOI and AI SBUs (group 3), one can again see that a major industrial 
company manages the SBU and occupies a central position in the network. One also notes, as 
in the previous group, companies or universities which exercise formal control dissociated 
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from any process of informal control. But these SBUs also include participants, mainly 
research organisations, situated in the centre of the network but which do not participate in the 
management activities of the SBU: in this last case, formal control is not accompanied by 
informal control. Thus in this group 3, control is tight but very dispersed and exercised by a 
great variety of participants. Moreover, informal control is more dispersed in this group of 
SBUs than in group 2 because it is sometimes exercised, outside the big industrial groups, by 
public research establishments.  
Finally, two small SBUs – LES and MST (group 4) – show total dissociation between the 
indicators of formal control (management of the SBU) and informal control (centrality of the 
network). These SBUs bring together a small number of heterogeneous projects and do not 
appear to be established around a common strategy. It is notable that control is very dispersed. 
In particular, informal control is exercised by a great variety of participants and a strongly 
centralised network does not appear (cf. table B in the annex). 
The following table synthesises our results by recalling the coordination mechanisms between 
formal control (management of the SBU) and informal control (centrality in the network) in 
the different groups of SBUs identified above. With respect to the theoretical discussion, we 
note that formal and informal control may, in certain cases, be dispersed among different 
actors, which justifies the distinction proposed in the first part between formal and informal 
control. We will now look for the role of proximity on this control. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3: Intensity and dispersion of forms of control within the SBUs of the 
Aerospace Valley cluster 
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3.2 Proximity and control within the SBUs 
The comparison between the groups of SBUs proposed in the preceding paragraph and the 
importance of the different forms of proximity does not reveal any correlation between the 
forms of proximity and the forms of control. Nevertheless, our results illustrate the existence 
of control by proximity. Table 3 shows different examples of SBUs which illustrate the four 
combinations presented in table 1. However a detailed analysis of the type of participants who 
exercise control within each group of SBUs associated with empirical, detailed knowledge 
resulting from the numerous interviews carried out allows us to shed some light on certain 
particular forms of control by proximity in the Aerospace Valley business and research 
cluster. We have obtained three types of results.  
Firstly, our analysis of the different forms of control shows the existence, for the SBUs of 
groups 1 to 3, of a small number of big industrial companies exercising both formal and 
informal control (cf. third column of table 3). We thus note a concentration of control in the 
hands of characteristic participants. In fact, the relationships established within the framework 
of collaborative projects are embedded in two other types of relationship, reinforcing this 
control: 
- on the one hand, the relationships relating to projects are embedded in localized social 
networks. These big industrial groups are practically all situated in Toulouse and thus 
share geographical proximity with the majority of the members of the Aerospace 
Valley cluster. Geographical proximity reinforces the formal control exercised in 
terms of the management of the SBU by facilitating meetings with these participants. 
It may also be noted that geographical proximity reinforces control not only inside the 
SBU, but also inside industrial groups, and particularly in the case of the ES SBU. For 
example, the number of links between establishments belonging to the same groups is 
significantly higher between establishments localised in the same area (31 links) than 
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between establishments which are distant from each other (12 links).This geographical 
proximity equally favours informal control through the establishment of informal 
meeting opportunities (for example during breakfasts organised between members of 
the cluster) which provide the occasion to develop the local social networks within 
which economic relationships are already embedded (the networks of former members 
of the prestigious Toulouse engineering schools specialised in aeronautics being very 
active). Thus informal control develops via localised social networks; 
- on the other hand, recent relationships created by collaborative projects managed by 
the Aerospace Valley cluster are embedded in sub-contracting networks which are 
often long-established. These same big groups are the prime contractors of the 
aerospace industry and on this basis share an organisational proximity with industrial 
companies of different sizes (research laboratories are excluded in this case) forming 
part of the supply chain (KECHIDI and TALBOT, 2010; GILLY et al. 2011). In the 
supply chain the prime contractors exercise intense formal and informal control over 
suppliers of inferior rank. Collaborative projects thus associate companies which are 
otherwise clients or suppliers, i.e. controllers vs controlled: in this situation, the 
control mechanisms used within the framework of the supply chain and more 
generally the sharing of cognitive resources and regulatory tools (organisational 
proximity) have an influence on the controls exercised in collaborative projects. The 
control relationships which operate in the context of collaborative projects are 
dependent on the control relationships already operating elsewhere: the story of co-
ordinations which have succeeded or failed, standards which have already been 
established, representations already shared, rules already imposed, fashion the 
interactions of today. Moreover, the context of a supply chain is not without effect: the 
asymmetrical positions of the parties involved mean that the sub-contracting SMEs 
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cannot escape from the control of the prime contractors without the risk of paying for 
such behaviour in their relationships outside collaborative projects. In such a situation 
this causality maybe reversed:  according to our interviews, collaborative projects are 
sometimes seen by the prime contractors as a new opportunity to exercise an 
additional control over the skills, the know-how and the knowledge of their suppliers.  
Secondly, groups 2 and 3 bring together establishments which exercise formal control by 
participating in the running of the SBU but which do not appear to exercise informal control 
(cf. fourth column of table 3). These are establishments which are geographically distant from 
the other members of these SBUs12. More precisely, while the majority of the participants in 
the AMS, NPT, ATSS and AI SBUs are situated in Toulouse and run by big Toulouse 
industrial groups, we note that formal control is exercised by establishments which this time 
are located in the Bordeaux region. These are public establishments (an engineering school in 
the case of the AI SBU), small companies (NPT SBU) or big industrial groups (ATSS and 
AMS SBUs): even if Bordeaux and Toulouse are only 220 km apart, geographical proximity 
could be stronger. On the other hand, the EPEE SBU, the majority of whose members are 
located around Bordeaux, is run jointly by a major Bordeaux group and a company located in 
the Toulouse region. It thus appears that formal control can be exercised in the context of 
weak geographical proximity. Even if geographical proximity could favour inter-
organisational relationships as explained in the theoretical part (cf. table 1), this type of 
control is still based on contractual engagements and codified mechanisms which necessitate 
less geographical proximity. Nevertheless, tacit knowledge is often associated with individual 
people, the fact of being physically close will have a positive effect on the transfer of such 
knowledge (AUDRETSCH and FELDMAN, 1996), reinforcing the constraint of geographical 
proximity. This is true even if the technologies have evolved by facilitating the informal 
interactions necessary to the sharing of tacit knowledge and if the physical interaction does 
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not necessarily imply permanent proximity of the individuals (GROSSETI and BES, 2001; 
TORRE and RALLET, 2005). One can thus understand why we observe, in the last column of 
table 3, that informal control is exercised by public research establishments playing the role of 
intermediary13, establishments located for the most part near the other establishments of the 
SBUs. In our case, exercise of informal control necessitates stronger geographical proximity 
than formal control. 
Thirdly and finally, as far as the articulation of the forms of proximity is concerned, it may be 
noted from table 2 that with the exception of the ES SBU, all the SBUs may be characterised 
by the fact that the two forms of proximity can be substituted for each other, at least in part. 
More precisely, participants who are geographically distant are generally closer from the point 
of view of their activities and vice-versa. Thus two SBUs, NPT and ATSS, are distinguished 
by a strong degree of geographical proximity between the participants, but a weaker degree of 
organisational proximity. For example, 19 of the 27 establishments of the ATSS SBU are 
located around Toulouse, but on the other hand these establishments (research laboratories, 
small and medium-sized businesses and major companies) are specialised in various domains 
around the theme of the safety and the security of air transport. For all the other SBUs, the 
participants are less geographically concentrated but share a strong organisational proximity. 
This is, for example, the case of the AI SBU, in which the participants are geographically 
dispersed notably in the Aquitaine (12 establishments out of 37) and Midi-Pyrénées (18 
establishments out of 37) regions, but also throughout the rest of France. On the other hand 
these establishments (research laboratories and small and medium-sized businesses) are for 
the most part specialised in activities close to technical and scientific research. It thus appears 
that the closer the participants are from the point of view of their activities, the more easily 
they can develop spatially-dispersed relationships. The fact of sharing common knowledge 
bases, of being subject to identical technical constraints, of having representations which are 
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relatively similar or which have even been co-developed during possible past interactions, of 
sharing rules of competition and financing particular to an industry, creates mutual 
understanding. This facilitates remote interactions and allows the removal of part of the 
constraint of geographical proximity that joint innovation may require. On the other hand, if 
the activities of the participants are relatively heterogeneous, frequent meetings will be 
necessary to remove the misunderstandings and ambiguities arising from different fields of 
activity. Finally, it should be noted that our results do not show that the substitution of 
geographical proximity for similar activities can be extended to the other two indicators of 
organisational proximity (belonging to the same organisation and organisational structure). 
 
 
4 Conclusion 
Having proposed a typology for the Strategic Business Units of the Aerospace Valley cluster, 
depending on the intensity and the dispersion of the forms of control, several results have 
been updated. First of all, it has emerged, unsurprisingly, that formal and informal control is 
generally exercised by a small number of major industrial groups located near the majority of 
the establishments which are members of these SBUs and which are also the prime 
contractors in the supply chain. In this case collaborative R&D projects become new 
occasions for the deployment of the control relationships which already operate. Next, we 
have also been able to note that formal control based on formalised mechanisms does not 
require as much geographical proximity as informal control. Our results concerning the 
substitution noted between the forms of proximity have also confirmed the hypothesis 
according to which geographical proximity compensates for weak organisational proximity.  
These results have consequences in terms of public policy. Thus, the public policy of 
competitiveness clusters seeks, in financing projects, seeks to encourage collaboration 
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between participants who are geographically close, heterogeneous in terms of organizational 
structure and complementary in terms of knowledge. This study shows that certain 
participants control the operation of the exchange and the achievement of the objectives, 
which allows the partners to feel secure and thus allows the exchange to take place. But 
hierarchies which are observed elsewhere are reproduced in collaborative projects. Thus, 
control has the disadvantage of reproducing existing a symmetrical modes of co-ordination 
which can inhibit collective innovation which calls for new combinations supposed to favour 
the evolution of established positions. From the point of view of public action, the key is to 
strike a balance between letting control become established in order to generate sufficient 
confidence and allowing relaxation of this same control in order to facilitate the emergence of 
new interactions, by their very nature less controllable.  
More generally, this study has not enabled us to specifically analyse the role of local 
institutions in terms of the manner in which they take part in control: we have used a 
theoretical framework specific to companies which does not take into account the specificities 
of public bodies, for example in terms of their objectives of regional development. This 
question may, moreover, be extended to other types of organisation, such as research 
institutions for which objectives of production of public knowledge can come into conflict 
with the strong requirements of confidentiality of companies.  
This study has other limitations. In theoretical terms, our study has not permitted the analysis 
of potentially negative effects (BOSCHMA, 2005; ZUINDEAU, 2006) that too great a 
proximity can have on control mechanisms. In effect, proximity can generate conflicts which 
can limit all forms of control. A possible development of our work would thus be to study the 
limiting role of conflicts on control mechanisms. Finally, analysing the role of proximity on 
the control of inter-firm relationships should lead us to question the efficiency of the control. 
Without replying directly to this question, our results show that in the case observed, the 
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proximities are widely used in order to make the formal and informal control effective. Thus 
proximities and controls contribute to the existence and the durability of collaborative 
projects. It would probably be useful to tackle this question more directly in a future study 
linking proximities, controls and performances of collaborations, for example by following 
the methodology used by BENGTSSON and SOLVELL (2004).  
Moreover, the intertemporal comparison of collaborative R&D projects within the same 
cluster would allow the introduction of dynamic elements into the analysis in order to observe 
the evolution of control relationships by proximity. In terms of methodology, other measures 
of control are possible. In particular, formal control could be measured through a study of the 
research contracts drawn up by the members of collaborative projects. Such a study would 
consist of analysing the degree of formalisation of the role of each of the participants in the 
collaborative projects, both in terms of the operation of exchanges during the research process 
and of the sharing of intellectual property of the results of the research. We could also include 
a more qualitative analysis of the objectives of the projects in order to see if the forms of 
control by proximity are different between theoretical and applied projects, but also between 
projects with different degrees of uncertainty or risk. In empirical terms, the choice of an 
industry in which the major groups occupy a predominant place led us to analyse relationships 
in which control was concentrated. Finally, this study should be extended to new activities in 
which control is more dispersed (mechanical engineering, photonics, etc.), by looking at other 
competitiveness clusters which are orientated towards innovation, but also by offering an 
analysis of control by proximity, this time between establishments collaborating in several 
competitiveness clusters.  
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ANNEXES  
INSERT FIGURE 1 : networks of collaborative projects in the SBUs of the Aerospace Valley 
cluster 
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Notes: 
1. The French public policy towards competitiveness clusters will be presented in paragraph 
2.1.  
2. More generally, for a critical review of the literature on research into Management Control 
Systems, cf. CHENHALL (2003).  
3. Trust is used here with both of its usual meanings (DUPUY and TORRE, 2004): trust 
towards another and trust in the fact that ones’ expectations will be met in the future.  
4. This figure, like all the figures presented in this introductory paragraph on the Aerospace 
Valley, is taken from the Aerospace Valley competitiveness cluster performance indicators 
published by the Inter-ministerial Delegation for Regional Planning and Competitiveness in 
2009 and available on competitiveness clusters Internet site:  
http://competitivite.gouv.fr/documents/commun/Les_Poles_en_mouvement/Poles_de_compet
itivite_mondiaux/tableaux-bord-statistiques/Aerospace_Valley_7123.pdf 
5. In the case where two establishments work together within the framework of several 
collaborative projects but within the same SBU, we consider these relationships to be 
different and they are thus counted separately for the calculation of the weighting of the 
different forms of proximity and of the density of the network.  
6. Cf. (FRIGANT and TALBOT 2005) more detail on the content of these perceptions in the 
aerospace industry. 
7. For more details concerning these categories, see: 
http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/default.asp?page=nomenclatures/naf2008/naf2008.htm.  
8. An urban area is defined as “a group of communes, geographically contiguous and without 
any enclaves, consisting of an urban centre with more than 10,000 jobs, and of rural 
communes or urban units (peri-urban zone) of which at least 40 % of the resident working 
population works in the urban centre or in communes attracted by it” (INSEE, 2011 : 
32 
 
 
http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/default.asp?page=definitions/aire-urbaine.htm). We have also 
verified that two organisations situated in two different urban areas are not situated in urban 
areas which have a common border (in which case they could be considered as being 
geographically close). 
9. Centrality of degree is defined as:
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of geodesics linking the individuals j and h and njh(i) the number of geodesics (minimum links) 
linking the individuals j and h  involving the individual i, with i≠j≠h. 
11. This methodology for measuring the two forms of control – formal and informal – as well 
as the information that we present afterwards concerning the management of the SBUS has 
been validated through interviews. These interviews were carried out between September 
2008 and February 2010 as part of a research contract co-financed by the Aquitaine and Midi-
Pyrénées Regions whose aim was to analyse organisational changes in the regional aerospace 
supply chain. In total, 38 interviews were carried out with companies, research laboratories 
and local authorities which support innovation. Carried out in a semi-directive fashion, these 
interviews were done with people who are responsible for different SBUs. These interviewees 
were generally senior managers from major groups (Airbus, Thales, Safran) made available 
for the occasion. These interviews provided the opportunity to collect concrete data 
concerning formal control. We thus sought to understand what were the formal control 
mechanisms set up (objectives, procedures, schedule, rules for evaluation) by these senior 
managers. Beyond the description of the tools, interviewing offers the advantage of being able 
to evaluate, by comparison and cross-referencing of the information collected, the 
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effectiveness and the intensity of their use. Fuller information concerning these results has 
been given in another study (GILLY et al. 2011). 
12. With the exception of the ASOI SBU which is highly specialised in the space industry, 
which is itself historically highly concentrated on Toulouse. Cf.. DUPUY and GILLY (1999) 
on this last point.  
13. Cf. VICENTE et al.(2010) for similar results in the GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite 
Systems) industry. 
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TABLE 1: Forms of control and proximity 
   Formal control  Informal control  
 
 Role of control Control results and 
behaviour  
Control behaviour 
by auto-regulation  
 
 
 
 
 
Role of 
proximity 
        Control  
          mechanisms 
 
 
Proximity  
effects 
- Joint statement of 
objectives (ex-ante) 
- standardised procedures,  
schedule, rules (ex-ante) 
-Evaluation systems (ex-
post) 
- Development of 
trust 
- Sharing of 
standards, values 
and beliefs 
Geographical 
proximity  
Favours inter-
organisational 
relationships 
- Face-to-face 
- Sentiment of 
belonging to a group 
by association with 
a place  
Geographical proximity 
reinforces formal control 
by facilitating  face-to-
face interactions  
Geographical 
proximity 
reinforces  informal 
control because 
social networks are 
often 
geographically 
localised 
Organisational 
proximity  
Conditions 
inter-
organisational 
relationships 
Sharing of cognitive 
resources and 
regulatory tools 
Organisational proximity 
conditions the setting up 
of regulatory mechanisms 
for behaviour 
Organisational 
proximity 
conditions the 
setting up of auto-
regulatory 
mechanisms for 
behaviour and 
creates trust  
Source: authors.   
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TABLE 2: measurement of control and proximity within the SBUs of the Aerospace Valley cluster 
Themes 
No. 
participa
nts 
No. 
projects 
No. links 
(density) 
Informal control: 
Degree centrality 
(mean/ 
maximum) 
Informal control: 
betweenness 
centrality 
(mean/maximum) 
Formal 
control: 
Running 
of SBU  
Similarity  
formal and 
informal 
control  
Geo. 
Proxi. 
 
Orga. 
Proxi 
manager/ 
group 
Orga. 
Proxi 
structure 
Orga. 
Proxi 
activity 
Embedded systems (ES) 111 27 
884 
(7.24%) 
2.11 
(13.90*) 
1.14 
(22.11*) 
3 
+++ 
(group 1) 
34.73% 
(0.48) 
2.38% 
(0.15) 
29.30% 
(0.45) 
39.71% 
(0.49) 
Aero-mechanics, 
materials and structures 
(AMS) 
131 21 
1628 
(9.55%) 
3.25 
(13.59) 
0.91 
(28.83) 
3 
++/- 
(group 2) 
14.68% 
(0.35) 
2.52% 
(0.16) 
30.96% 
(0.46) 
43.55% 
(0.50) 
Navigation, positioning 
and telecommunications 
(NPT) 
69 16 
 
399 
(8.50)% 
4.25 
(26.10 ) 
1.42 
(37.57) 
4 (1) 
++/- 
(group 2) 
49.62% 
(0.50) 
0.50% 
(0.07) 
29.57% 
(0.46) 
36.34% 
(0.48) 
Air transport safety and 
security (ATSS) 
27 5 
129 
(17.06%) 
12.25 
(35.90) 
0.04 
(0.11) 
2 
++/- 
(group 2) 
58.14% 
(0.49) 
6.20% 
(0.24) 
22.48% 
(0.42) 
32.56% 
(0.47) 
Access to space and 
orbital infrastructures 
16 4 
48 
(20%) 
27.50 
(53.33) 
0.71 
(11.43) 
2 
+/- 
(group 3) 
12.50% 
(0.33) 
6.25% 
(0.24) 
39.58% 
(0.49) 
58.33% 
(0.50) 
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Source: authors, following the description of the collaborative projects of the Aerospace Valley cluster in June 2009.  
Legend: The first three columns of the table give information on the overall structure of each SBU: the themes of each SBU, the number of establishments which are members 
of each SBU, as well as the number of collaborative projects belonging to each SBU. The next column gives the number of dyadic links analysed in terms of this network as 
well as, in brackets, information on the density of the network, i.e. the number of links divided by the number of possible links. The next two columns allow the evaluation of 
the weight of the informal control through measures of centrality of the two networks. For each of the two forms de centrality (degree, betweenness), we indicate the mean 
degree of centrality of all the participants in the SBU, as well as the maximum degree of centrality. The next column allows the evaluation of the weight of formal control by 
representing the number of establishments leader of the SBU and, in brackets, the number of establishments leader which do not participate in a single collaborative project of 
this SBU. The next column refers to situations where formal and informal control are cumulative: the + (and, in the negative sense, the -) represent the greater or lesser 
(ASOI) 
Architecture and 
Integration (AI) 
36 5 
190 
(15.08%) 
30.93 
(61.11*) 
3.18 
(41.27*) 
2 
+/- 
(group 3) 
23.68% 
(0.43) 
2.63% 
(0.16) 
34.74% 
(0.48) 
57.89% 
(0.49) 
Energy, propulsion 
systems, engines, 
environment (EPEE) 
33 7 
122 
(11.55%) 
11.55 
(32.81) 
3.56 
(54.23) 
2 (1) 
+/- 
(group 3) 
15.58% 
(0.36) 
1.64% 
(0.13) 
31.15% 
(0.46) 
43.44% 
(0.48) 
Maintenance, services 
and training (MST) 
17 3 
66 
(25.89%) 
24.26 
(40.62**) 
0.49 
(2.08**) 
2 (1) 
--- 
(group 4) 
6.06% 
(0.24) 
0%*** 
21.21% 
(0.41) 
57.58% 
(0.49) 
Living Earth and space 
(LES) 
25 4 
86 
(14.33%) 
28.67 
(54.17) 
2.43 
(32.61) 
4 (3) 
--- 
(group 4) 
32.56% 
(0.47) 
0.%*** 
25.58% 
(0.44) 
61.63% 
(0.49) 
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degrees of similarity between the coordinators of the SBU and the central participants of the networks. The last four columns give information about the weight of the 
different forms of proximity within each of these SBUs. For each form of proximity, we indicate the mean number (with the standard deviation in brackets) of relationships 
(in the sense of a joint collaborative project between two establishments) for which the participants are considered as being close.  
NB:  
* In the AI and ES SBUs, unlike all the other SBUs, the same establishments do not have the highest levels of degree and betweenness centrality. In the case of the AI SBU, 
two research establishments show the highest levels of degree centrality and betweenness centrality. In the case of the ES SBU, it is a major aeronautical group located in 
Toulouse which has the highest level of degree centrality and a university laboratory which has the highest level of betweenness centrality. And despite this dispersion, the 
levels of centrality of these four participants remain very high for the two SBUs.  
** In the MST SBU, four companies of equivalent size show maximum (and equal) levels of centrality (according to the three forms of calculation). Thus these companies 
share the informal control of this SBU. 
*** The value 0 in the case of organisational proximity in terms of belonging to a group or an university or public research organism indicates that, in the MST and LES 
SBUs, each participant belongs to a distinct group or university or public research organism. 
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TABLE 3: Intensity and dispersion of forms of control within the SBUs of the Aerospace 
Valley cluster 
 Degree of 
intensity and 
dispersion of 
control 
Simultaneous formal 
and informal 
control, exercised by 
one (or several) 
participant(s) 
Formal control 
exercised par one (or 
several) 
participant(s) who do 
not exercise 
simultaneous 
informal control 
Informal control 
exercised par one (or 
several) 
participant(s) who do 
not exercise 
simultaneous formal 
control 
Group 1: SBU ES Control tight 
and 
concentrated 
Major industrial 
groups and a 
research laboratory 
/ / 
Group 2: SBU AMS, 
NPT and ATSS  
Control fairly 
tight and fairly 
concentrated 
Major industrial 
groups 
Various 
establishments  
(depending on the 
SBU) 
/ 
Group 3: SBU AI, 
EPEE and ASOI 
Control tight 
but dispersed 
Major industrial 
groups 
Various 
establishments  
(depending on the 
SBU) 
Public research 
establishments  
Group 4: SBU MST 
and LVE  
Control slack 
and dispersed 
/ Various 
establishments  
(depending on the 
SBU) 
/ 
Source: authors.   
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FIGURE  1 : networks of collaborative projects in the SBUs of the Aerospace Valley cluster 
 Group 1 : The ES SBU 
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Group 2 
The NPT SBU  The AMS SBU 
 
 
The ATSS SBU   
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Group 3 
 
The ASOI SBU The AI SBU 
The EPEE SBU  
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Group 4 
The MST SBU  The LES SBU  
 
Source: authors, following the description of the collaborative projects of the Aerospace 
Valley cluster in June 2009. 
 
Legend:  Each node in the network represents an establishment and each line represents joint 
participation in at least one collaborative project of an SBU.  
The thickness of the lines is proportional to the numbers of collaborative projects involving 
the two participants.  
The colour and the shape of the nodes characterises the establishments which are members of 
this SBU. Establishments located in Midi Pyrénées (around Toulouse) are shown in dark 
grey, establishments located in Aquitaine (around Bordeaux or Pau) are shown in pale grey 
and establishments located throughout the rest of France are shown in white. Circles represent  
research laboratories, and squares represent companies. The size of the squares is proportional 
to the size of the companies.  
The nodes with an M in the centre are the establishments which manage the SBU. 
 
